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HUME
AND
THE END OF DESIGN
Michael F. Patton, Jr.

In order to pass the B.A. examination, it was, also, necessary
to get up Paley's Evidences of Christianity, and his Moral
Philosophy....The logic of this book and as I may add of his
Nattiral Theology gave me as much delight as did Euclid. The
careful study of these works, without attempting to learn any
part by rote, was the only part of the Academical Course
which, as I then felt and as I still believe, was of the least use
to me in the education of my mind. I did not at that time
trouble myself about Paley's premises; and taking these on
trust I was charmed and convinced of the long line of argu
mentation. — ChixltsDarwrn, Autobiography

/\ -^arwin is right—the arguments adduced by Paley and
J others are charming and seductive. For generations,
educated people thought their conclusions unavoidable
even after Darwin offered a naturalistic account of the purported design
the teleological argument takes as its foundation. Darwin was moti
vated to explain two things which seemed to be crying out for
explanation—the amazing fit between organism and environment and
the astonishing variety of organisms in general. Even after evolution
ary theory became biological bedrock, there are new defenders of the
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teleological argument. Take, for example, the intelligent design
theorists, who are credentialed in the sciences and who argue that there
are "irreducibly complex biological systems" which musth.3ve been the
product of intelligent design.' Many physicists investigating cosmology
appeal these days to the Anthropic Principle, which is really nothing
more than a version of the teleological argument.^ Here is one very
vocal opponent of such reasoning, Richard Dawkins, well-known
atheist, defender of Darwin and the Charles Simonyi Chair of the
Public Understanding of Science at Oxford, sounding just like an
enlightenment deist on the issue of complex biological systems and how
they stand in need of explanation after Paley's teleological argument
throws down the gauntlet:
I shall explain all this, and much else besides. But one thing
I shall not do is belittle the wonder of the living "watches"
that so inspired Paley. On the contrary, I shall try to
illustrate my feeling here that Paley could have gone even
further. When it comes to feeling awe over living "watches"
I yield to nobody. I feel more in common with the Reverend
William Paley than I do with the distinguished modem
philosopher, a well-known atheist, with whom I once
discussed the matter at dinner. I said that I could not imagine
being an atheist at any time before 1859, when Darwin's
Origin of Species was published. "What about Hume," replied
the philosopher. "How did Hume explain the organized
complexity of the living world?" I asked. "He didn't," said
the philosopher. "Why does it need any special explana
tion?"'
Dawkins goes on to say that what it takes to be an "intellectually
fulfilled atheist" is not just to know that the Judeo-Christian God is not
a good explanation for the phenomena of life, but in addition, to have

' For a good colleaion of recent articles on both sides of the debate, see Robert Pennock,
Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics (Cambridge: Bradford Books, 2001).
^ For an exhaustive account of the various approaches to the anthropic argument, see John
Barrow and Frank Tippler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (London: Oxford University
Press, 1988).
' Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (New York, Norton, 1987) 5-6.
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an alternative explanation for the "organized complexity of the living
world."
So we have the Enlightenment thinkers, Darwin, Dawkins, and a
host of other scientists believing that there must be some explanation
for the observed complexity of the natural world, whether it be an
intelligent designer or the forces of natural selection. All of them are
wrong. In Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and in other works,
David Hume addresses all of these concerns in his responses to works
which inspired Paley and offers a completely devastating rebuttal. After
removing any force the teleological argument may be thought to have,
Hume goes on to explain why the quest for this sort if explanation is
futile. Explanations must come to some end, and nothing can justify
moving beyond the natural world in our explanations.

^ The Eternal Argument ^
When you see a simdial or a water-clock, you see that it tells
the time by design and not by chance. How then can you
imagine that the universe as a whole is devoid of purpose and
intelligence, when it embraces everything, including these
artifacts themselves and their artificers?
Cicero, De
Natura Deorum.

After its classical beginnings in Cicero, the teleological argument has
enjoyed a nearly unbroken history as being one of the most popular and
most convincing arguments for the existence of God that the propo
nents of natural religion have ever put forward. Despite its ancient
pedigree and its current revival at the hands of contemporary intelligent
design theorists and many cosmologists, the teleological argument's
heyday was during the Enlightenment, the result of the Enlightenment
thinkers looking for explanations for the complexity of the observed
universe. Arising primarily from studies in biology and physics, the
teleological argument is what kept the Deists from being atheists,
although many of their opponents called them such anyway.
During the Enlightenment, the teleological argument was
multifaceted and subtle, and led different thinkers to different conclu
sions. While the interpretations of the teleological argument range
from the minimal (that there is an intelligent author of nature whose
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further properties are unknowable) to the luxurious (that all of
Christian theology is written into nature), most enlightenment figures
took the argument to have something important to say about the
universe and its inhabitants at the time of the rise of modern science.
Even its most famous critic, David Hume, seems to have granted that
this line of reasoning did lead somewhere new and interesting, but not
quite so interesting as all the others thought.
In its most straightforward reading (that most familiar to the
modern ear), the teleological argument is a proof of God's existence
based on observable evidence: the universe is filled with extraordinarily
complex things; we know from our experience that complexity is
always associated with intelligent design and action, so the universe
must be the product of intelligent design and creative activity. The
slightly more extravagant interpretations begin to assign traits to the
author of nature, usually beginning with infinite power and wisdom.
But in the hands of many prominent thinkers in the eighteenth
Century, the teleological argument was extended to serve as a proof of
the nature of God, the content of morality and the existence of an
afterlife.
I argue that Hume had in his works the materials to challenge both
the conclusions pushed by friends of the design argument. Even
though he does not finish off the argument in the Dialogues Concerning
Natural Religion (circa 1757), he does speak to all the points of the
argument elsewhere in his works, especially in the Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding (1748). I will discuss the range of teleological
arguments, explain Hume's standard response and then show why
Hume should be read as an atheist who rejects any conclusions based on
the teleological argument given his other writings.
Despite Hume's withering onslaught, the teleological argument
lives on today. Defenders of the argument often point out that Hume
himself stopped short of denying the existence of any sort of extraempirical source of the apparent complexity of the universe—one of his
characters speculates that we ought to suppose some vague vegetative
force organizes the matter we see around us in the natural world.
Hume's objections to the teleological argument involve more than
merely its logical shortcomings. Hume inverts the commonly accepted
rules for argument by analogy and offers an accoimt of reasoning in his
works that does leave his final position as one of atheism, if we are
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assessing what beliefs natural religion can justify. In what follows, I will
trace the development of the teleological argument as we find it in Ray
and Butler and then show how Hume disarms their reasoning point by
point while advancing a more acceptable account of both analogical
reasoning and rational behef formation.

^ John Ray and the Teleological Argument ^
In his work The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of the Creation
(1691), John Ray urges natural religion on his readers. Revelation,
scripture and miraculous occurrences all fail to meet two of the main
requirements of empirical science: public observability and repeatabil
ity. The evidence-base for existence proofs based in natural religion,
however, are available to all, at any time:
First, the Belief of a Deity being the Foundation of all
Religion, (Religion, being nothing but a devout Worshiping
of God, or an Inclination of Mind to serve and worship Him)
for he that cometh to God, must believe that he is, it is a
Matter of the highest concernment, to be firmly settled and
established in a full Persuasion of this main Point: Now this
must be demonstrated by Arguments drawn from the Light
of Nature, and Works of the Creation: For as all other
Sciences, so Divinity proves not, but supposes its Subjects,
taking it for granted that by Natural Light, Men are suffi
ciently convinced of the Being of a Deity. There are indeed
supernatural Demonstrations of this fundamental Truth, but
not common to all Persons or Times, and so liable to Cavil
and Exception by Atheistical Persons, as inward Illuminations
of Mind, a Spirit of Prophecy and Foretelling future Contin
gents, illustrious Miracles, and the like. But these Proofs taken
from Effects, and Operations, exposed to every Man's view,
not to be denied or questioned by any, are most effectual to
convince, all that deny or doubt of it.*

^ John Ray, The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of the Creation (1691), 3.
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So it turns out that revelation is not required for justified belief in God.
Since empirical science, armed with the fairly new telescope and
microscope, lays bare the previously hidden complexity of the cosmos
of the heavens above and the microcosmos of the cell, the entirety of
our experience cries out for explanation by design. We can see that any
pile of grass, or anything more complex than that, must have a designer
behind it. Ray chooses the teleological argument as the best proof to be
taken from experience, in part because of its effectiveness at convincing
people of all walks of life of the existence of God, rather than being
effective only for those who follow abstruse philosophical argument:
Neither are they only convictive of the greatest and subtlest
Adversaries, but inteUigible also to the meanest Capacities:
For you may hear illiterate Persons of the lowest Rank of the
Commonalty affirming. That they need no Proof of theBeing
of a God, for that every Pile of Grass, or Ear of Corn,
sufficiently proves that: For, say they, all the Men of the
World cannot make such a thing as one of these; and if they
cannot do it, who can, or did make it but God.' To tell them,
that it made itself, or sprung up by Chance, would be as
ridiculous as to tell the greatest Philosopher so.'
The argument, familiarly, asserts that since the features of the natural
world are beyond our human capacity to create, someone else must
have made them. The culprit is God. As with most occurrences of the
teleological argument, Ray passes from the minimalist interpretation of
the proof (that there is a God) to a more robust interpretation of the
proof which gives an account of some of the properties God possesses.
This argument depends on gauging the complexity of the parts of
nature in question and arguing by analogy that the more complex the
parts of nature are seen to be, the more powerful and wise God must be
to have invented and implemented them. The vastness of the universe
suggests similar vastness of power in the designer thereof:
Of the first of these I shall say little, only briefly run over the
Works of this visible World, and give some guess at the
' Ray, Wisdom of God, 4.
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Number of them; whence it will appear, that upon this
account they will deserve Admiration, the Number of them
being uninvestigable by us; and so affording us a demonstra
tive Proof of the unlimited Extent of the Creator's Skill, and
the foecundity of his Wisdom and Power.'
Ray now offers an account of how vast creation is, pointing out that the
telescope has revealed that the Milky Way is actually a stretch of
innumerably many stars. These stars, by analogy to the sun, presum
ably have even more numerous planets circling them, each of which is,
by analogy to the earth, full of its own complement of complexities. In
discussing all of these presumed complexities, Ray makes the explicit
comparison of the intelligence behind human art to the intelligence
required to explain what we see in the natural order. If we must be
intelligent to make several different types of artifact, how much more
intelligent must the designer of the universe be to make the staggering
diversity of plants and animals discovered in nature, some of which
accomplish the same sort of activity (flying, for example) through
completely different means:
What can we infer from all this? If the Number of Creatures
be so exceeding great, how great nay, immense must needs be
the Power and Wisdom of him who form'd them all! For
(that I may borrow the Words of a noble and excellent
Author) as it argues and manifests more Skill by far in an
Artificer, to be able to frame both Clocks and Watches, and
Pumps, and Mills and Grenades, and Rockets, than he could
display in making but one of those sorts of Engines; so the
Almighty discovers more of his Wisdom in forming such a
vast Multitude of different Sorts of Creatures, and all with
admirable and irreprovable Art, than if he had created but a
few; for this declares the Greatness and unbounded Capacity
of his Understanding. Again, the same Superiority of Knowl
edge would be display'd, by contriving Engines of the same
Kind, or for the same Purposes, after different Fashions, as
the moving of Clocks or other Engines by Springs instead of
' Ray, Wisdom of God,5.
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Weights; So the infinitely Wise Creator hath shewn many
Instances, that he is not confin'd to one only instrument for
the working one Effect, but can perform the same thing by
divers means. So, though feathers seem necessary for flying,
yet hath he enabled several creatures to fly without them, as
two Sorts of Fishes, one Sort of Lizard, and the Bat, not to
mention the numerous Tribes of flying Insects.'

Ray, a very observant and thorough naturalist, adds empirical support
to this line of reasoning for many, many pages, and eventually produces
what will become the dominant comparison for the teleological
argument, the human eye as an exemplar of complex design, efficiency,
economy of parts and specificity and importance of function:
Seeing then the Eye is composed of so great Variety of Parts,
all conspiring to the Use of Vision, whereof some are abso
lutely necessary, others very useful and convenient, none idle
or superfluous; and which is remarkable, many of them of a
different Figure and Consistency from any others in the Body
besides, as being transparent, which it was absolutely neces
sary they should be, to transmit the Rays of Light: Who can
but believe that this Organ was designed and made Purposely
for the Use for which it serves?'
The analogy has still not been exhausted. We know that God is more
powerful than we are since he makes bigger and more difficult-to-make
items; we know he is more intelligent than we are, since he makes more
complicated things than we can even invent; we know that he creates
with a plan in mind, because we see all the pieces of, say, the human
body, adjusted to a single purpose rather than being thrown together
willy-nilly. What else can we leam? It turns out we can show that God
is perfect. If we examine our creative processes, we see that we, as
imperfect beings, constantly need to refine and improve our cre
ations—we seldom get them right the first time and even when we do,

' Ray, Wisdom of God, 4.25-26.
' Ray, Wisdom of God, 93-94.
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they eventually wear and need to be replaced. God's products are
different:
Man is always mending and altering his Works: But Nature
observes the same Tenor, because her Works are so perfect,
that there is no Place for Amendments; nothing that can be
reprehended. The most Sagacious Men in so many Ages, have
not been able to find any Flaw in these Divinely contrived
and formed Machines, no Blot or Error in this great Volume
of the World, as if any thing had been an imperfect Essay at
the first, to use the Bishop of Chester's words: Nothing that
can be altered for the better; nothing but if it were altered
would be marred.'
There is no greater; at least no more palpable and convincing
Argument of the Existence of a Deity, than the admirable Art
and Wisdom that discovers itself in the Make and Constitu
tion, the Order and Disposition, the Ends and Uses of all the
Parts and Members of this stately Fabrick of Heaven and
Earth: For if in the Works of Art, as for Example, a curious
Edifice or Machine,' Counsel, Design, and Direction to an
End appearing in the whole Frame, and in all the several
pieces of it, do necessarily infer the Being and Operation of
some intelligent Architect or Engineer, why shall not also in
the Works of Nature, that (grandeur and Magnificence, that
excellent Contrivance for Beauty, Order, Use, &c. which is
observable in them, wherein they do as much transcend the
Effects of humane Art as infinite Power and Wisdom exceeds
finite, infer the Existence and Efficiency of an Omnipotent
and All-Wise Creator?"
Since nature is good, nay perfect, as it is, we can now infer a perfect
author of nature. The teleological argument yields an omnipotent and
omniscient God. Nothing in the natural order could be changed

' Ray, Wisdom of God, 94.
Ray, Wisdom of God, 10.
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without making it worse, so its pedigree is settled—The Universe is the
product of an All-Wise, Omnipotent and Morally Perfect God.
Next, Ray extends the implications of the Teleological Argument,
inferring that the creator put everything here for a purpose and gave his
creatures the knowledge of how to use what he gave them:
So that we see every Part in Animals is fitted to its Use, and
the Knowledge of this Use put into them: For neither do any
Sort of web-footed Fowls live constantly upon the Land, or
fear to enter the Water, nor any Land-Fowl so much as
attempt to swim there. Birds of the same Kind make their
Nests of the same Materials, laid in the same Order, and
exactly of the same Figure; so that by the Sight of the Nest
one may certainly know what Bird it belongs to."
In the case of humans, the designer built in the capacity to experience
pain and pleasure so that we might negotiate the variotis perils of the
world. Ray adds as an afterthought that pain almost always accompa
nies activities prohibited by God and therefore tells us how we must act
to safeguard our souls:
I might add hereto, that even Pain, which is the most grievous
and afflictive thing that we are sensible of, is of great use to
us. God hath annexed a Sense of Pain to all Diseases and
Harms of the Body inward and outward, (and there is no Pain
but proceeds from some Harm or Disease) to be an effectual
Spur to excite and quicken us to seek for speedy Help or
Remedy; and hath so order'd it, that as the Disease heals, so
the Pain abates. Neither doth Pain provoke us only to seek
ease and Relief when we labour under it, but also makes us
careful to avoid for the future all such things as are productive
of it; that is, such things as are hurtful to our Bodies, and
destructive of the Health and Well-being of them, which also
are, for the most part, prohibited by God, and so sinful and
injurious to our Souls."

" Ray, Wisdom of God, 50-51.
" Ray, Wisdom of God, 95-96.
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Ray makes only a mention of pain's relation to the well-being of our
soul; most his admiration involves the fact that pain is a remarkably
efficacious means to the end of causing creatures to learn how to avoid
bodily injury. Ray's inclinations are closer to the minimalist interpreta
tions favored by the deists, but in his final clause he begins a trend in
the application of the teleological argument by which morality can now
be discovered by the natural sciences. Butler will develop this tendency
further in The Analogy of Religion.

^ Joseph Butler and The Analogy of Religion ^
For, will any man in his senses say, that it is less difficult to
conceive, how the world came to be and to continue as it is,
without, than with, an intelligent Author and Governor of
it.>"

In the spirit of the times in which he hved, Joseph Butler was aware that
the strongest arguments for any conclusion whatever were those based
on reason, such as in the deductive sciences, followed in second place by
those based on experience. Of the conclusions based on experience, he
admits that probabilistic reasoning based on past experience is the
weakest form, but, following a somewhat Lockean spirit, Butler argues
that when this reasoning is repeated often enough and when it is all we
have to go on, it can suffice and even rise to the height of moral
certainty, Butler begins the Analogy (1736) by giving his account of
how we are permitted to reason from such experience:
But that the lightest possible presumption is of the nature of
probability, appears from hence; that such low presumption,
often repeated, will amount even to moral certainty. Thus a
man's having observed the ebb and flow of the tide to-day,
affords some sort of presumption, though the lowest imagin
able, that it may happen again tomorrow: but the observation
of this event for so many days, and months, and ages to-

" W. E. Gladstone, editor, The Works of Joseph Butler, Vol. 1 (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1995),
\77.
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gether, as it has been observed by mankind, gives us a full
assurance that it will."

Thus, despite the unconvincing nature of any one piece of evidence, we
can come to have complete certainty that there will be a tide tomorrow
given the repeated individual evidences of the past.
Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but an imperfect
kind of information; and is to be considered as relative only
to beings of limited experience...[B]ut to us, probability is the
very guide of life."
Or, in other cases where relevant evidence caimot be repeatedly had,
even a small amount of probabilistic evidence will do:
From these things it follows, that in questions of difficulty, or
such as are thought so, where more satisfactory evidence
cannot be had or is not seen; if the result of examination be,
that there appears upon the whole, any the lowest presump
tion on one side, and none on the other...this determines the
question, even in matters of speculation; and in matters of
practice, will lay us under an absolute and formal obligation,
in point of prudence or low probability, though it be so low
as to leave the mind in very great doubt which is the truth."
Butler's goal here is to find some argument, not based on revealed
theology, that the traits of the Christian God are as scripture claims
them to be. Butler is responding to the deists and atheists, who argue
that the moral order implied by revelation and the other features of
revealed Christianity such as the doctrine of the afterlife are not
supportable with natural, observable evidence. In trying to sway these
people, Butler cites Origen, who makes a startling analogy between the
imperfection of our understanding of the scriptures and the imperfec
tion of our understanding of the natural world:

" Gladstone, Butler, 3.
" Gladstone, Butler, 5.
" Gladstone, Butler, 6.
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Hence, namely from analogical reasoning, Origen has with
singular sagacity observed, that he who believes the scripture to
have proceeded from him who is the Author of nature, may well
expect to find the same sort of difficulties in it, as are found in the
constitution of nature...\f\i there be an analogy or likeness
between that system of things and dispensation of Providence,
which revelation informs us of, and that system of things and
dispensation of Providence, which experience together with
reason informs us of, i.e., the known course of nature; this is
a presumption, that they have the same author and cause; at
least so far as to answer objections against the former's being
from God, drawn from any thing which is analogical or
similar to what is in the latter, which is acknowledged to be
from him; for an Author of nature is here supposed.
Amazingly, if we fail to understand two things equally, it turns out that
by the analogy of their having equal parts of mystery, we are entitled
to conclude that they both are the products of the same creator—in this
case, God. Thus, although the natural world is not quite as Butler
thinks a reader of scripture would imagine it to be, he thinks our
difficulties in properly understanding scripture jibe with the recalci
trance of the world. Going further, Butler rejects as idle fancy the views
of those who think they can imagine a better world where people
would be happier—he says men are not fit to make such judgments of
God's work in the same way that an undereducated person is not fit to
judge what is best for an educated one. Instead we should "ascribe all
moral perfection to God" and "deny all imperfection of him.""
Butler takes God's existence as proven already by the testimony of
nature as explained in Ray's teleological argument. This is perfectly
acceptable to most of his readers, indeed, many if not most Enlighten
ment thinkers accepted the design of the tmiverse but denied the claims
of traditional religions.
[Tjaking for proved, that there is an intelligent author of
nature, and natural Governor of the world. For as there is no

" Gladstone, Butler, 9-10.
" Gladstone, Butler,14-15.
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presumption against this prior to the proof of it: so it has
been often proved with accumulated evidence; from the most
ancient tradition and testimony; and from the general consent
of mankind. Nor does it appear, so far as I can find, to be
denied by the generality of those who profess themselves
dissatisfied with the evidence of religion."

This being accepted, the Analogy is an argument that the deists and
others should accept that the teleological argument verifies the claims
of scripture in addition to showing there is an author of nature.
And let us compare the known constitution and course of
things with what is said to be the moral system of nature; the
acknowledged dispensations of Providence, or that govern
ment which we find ourselves under, with what religion
teaches us to believe and expect; and see whether they are not
analogous and of a piece. And upon such a comparison it
will, I think, be found, that they are very much so; that both
may be traced up to the same general laws, and resolved into
the same principles of divine conduct.^®
It will undeniably show, what too many want to have shown
them, that the system of religion, both natural and reveled,
considered only as a system, and prior to a proof of it, is not
a subject of ridicule, unless that of nature be so too. And it
will afford an answer to almost all objections against the
system both of natural and revealed rehgion.^'
I will focus on three of Butler's main uses of the teleological argument.
It is used to support the existence of an afterlife, the nature of morality
and God's judgment.
The afterlife: Butler argues that we are justified in expecting the
world to continue as it has so far unless we have evidence that it will

" Gladstone, Butler, 12.
® Gladstone, Butler, 15.
" Gladstone, Butler, 16.
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not. He takes this tenet of induction and applies it to what he says we
observe in living beings. First, the passage of different material
components through our bodies shows that we are not identical with
the matter that composes us. Second, there is no part of the body that
seems to be identical to us—that is, for any body part or function we
can think of, we can see that we would survive the loss of that part or
function in isolation. Third, he asserts that we are distinct from our
senses, since they report to us (whatever we may be) and we interpret
their messages, and so he concludes that we are more clearly identified
with reflection than perception and that there is no reason to suspect
that reflection ceases when perception seems to. He ends by claiming
to have shown that it is "highly probable" that we survive bodily death,
and now goes on to show what we reasonably have to expect in the
afterlife. In fact, in the conclusion of this part of the Analogy, Butler
claims it is irrational to think we face extinction at death, saying "that
we are now living beings, affords us a strong probability that we shall
continue so; unless there be some positive ground, and there is none
from reason or analogy, to think that death will destroy us."^^
Morality on Earth: Butler claims that we can determine the truths
of morality by examining the features of the natural world. Since we
are capable of experiencing both pleasures and pains (both physical and
mental), and since pain makes us want to avoid its cause just a pleasure
makes us want to seek its cause, the association of these sensations with
various activities is used by God to show us what he would and would
not have us do. God clearly has chosen virtue over vice, since one is
(pretty) uniformly rewarded while the other is (pretty) uniformly
punished. The pleasures and pains are pretty uniformly associated with
actions, so there seems to be a clear preference expressed by God about
how we should behave—He clearly wants us to perform certain actions
and not others.
Furthermore, since the majority of these pleasures and pains
accompany actions of our own choosing rather than simply occurring
regardless of what we do, God is allowing us free choice and autonomy
while at the same time providing instruction regarding Flis will. Thus,
the world provides a continual lesson, and we will become better
people, morally speaking, the more we pay attention.
" Gladstone, Butler, 178.
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Judgment at Death: Becaiise we are presiuned to be convinced both
that there is an afterlife and that there is a moral order here on earth, we
should asstune that our future well-being depends on our behavior as
much as our present behavior does. Otherwise there is no point to the
moral instruction. Butler argues that t is reasonable to suppose that this
life is as a youthful period preceding adulthood—that it is a probation
ary period after which we will be judged fit or unfit for admission to
heaven. The purpose of the trial is to improve us morally by shaping
our behavior and habits so that we may deserve our fate in the afterlife.
Butler's robust interpretation of the teleological argument
accomplishes nothing short of elevating the revealed word of the Bible
to the status of physical law. So long as Butler's account of what is
permitted in analogical reasoning is correct, the gulf between natural
and revealed religion is finally closed.

^ Hume Contra Butler ^
In part V of the Dialogues ConcemingNaturalReligion, Hume lists four
immediate unwanted consequences for Butler's reliance on argument by
analogy. First, Butler cannot attribute any infinite properties to the
author of nature because all we observe is finite and analogy can carry
us no further than what we observe. Second, perfection caimot be
ascribed to the author of nature, since the observed world is not perfect.
Third, the unity of the author of nature is unprovable by analogy and
finally, the immateriality of the author of nature cannot be proven.
All of these results are indeed unwelcome, and all stem from the
fact that Butler has overtaxed his analogy specifically and analogical
arguments in general.
Where we see a body raised in a scale, we are sure there is in
the opposite scale, however concealed from sight, some
counterposing weight equal to it; but it is still allowed to
doubt whether that weight be an aggregate of distinct bodies
or one tmiform mass.^

" David Hume, Dialopies Concerning Natural Reli^on (New York: Hafner, 1948), 40.
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In the Treatise (1739), Hume argues that we cannot infer anything about
the cause of an event beyond what the properties of the event disclose
as necessary. If, for example, we see a 100-gram weight being lifted on
the arm of an equal-arm balance, we may assert that there is more than
100 grams on the other side of the arm. We may not, however,
specidate in good faith about whether it be 101,1000, or 10,000 grams
on the other side with any justification. Combining these two lines of
thought, we get all of the results mentioned above—the author of nature
cannot be reasonably be thought to be one, all-powerful, perfect or
infinite in any way.
Hume goes on to argue that any argument by analogy is limited in
its conclusions to what we observe here in the natural order. This being
so, the more we want to attribute properties observed in humans to the
deity, the more deity should be thought of in human terms. Since we
have only ever observed intelligence in human beings (or at least in
animals), we should conclude that the intelligence behind the universe
resides in some animal. Further, we would be entitled to extend the
argument further still. Hume ends by saying the teleological argument
most naturally ends in anthropomorphism—assigning corporeality and
sexual reproduction to the author of nature, which of course Butler
would never accept. The notion of God as incorporeal is essential to
Butler's theology, but there is no way to get that conclusion from the
observations of the material realm.
With respect to the moral properties of God, Butler fares even less
well in Hume's hands. Hume offers four points against the inference
of the existence of a very powerful, wise and benevolent deity from the
study of nature. First is the problem of pain. On the theory that there
is such an author of nature, we cannot suppose he wants us to be happy
and pain free.
Is it possible...you can still...assert the moral attributes of the
Deity, his justice, benevolence, mercy, and rectitude, to be of
the same with these virtues in human creatures? His power,
we allow, is infinite; whatever he wills is executed; but
neither man nor any other animal is happy; therefore, he does
not will their happiness. His wisdom is infinite; he is never
mistaken in choosing the means to any end; but the course of
nature tends not to human or animal felicity; therefore, it is

96

1650-1850
not established for that purpose...In what respect, then, do his
benevolence and mercy resemble the benevolence and mercy
of men?^"*

Certainly the existence of suffering is not a problem for those who
accept revealed religion, for then all apparent imperfections may be
explained away as the mysterious workings of the unfathomable mind
of God:
Let us allow that, if the goodness of the Deity (I mean a
goodness like the human) could be established on any
tolerable reasons a priori, these phenomena, however unto
ward, would not be sufficient to subvert that principle, but
might easily, in some unknown manner, be reconcilable to it.
But let us still assert, as this goodness is not antecedently
established but must be inferred from the phenomena, there
can be no groimd for such an inference while there are so
many ills in the universe, and while these ills might so easily
have been remedied, as far as human understanding can be
allowed to judge on such as subject. ^
But as soon as we rely solely on what we observe in nature and confine
ourselves to human terms of approval and disapproval, we cannot help
but abandon the idea of the God of the scriptures. Butler, it seems,
smuggles in his idea of a perfect God and thereby taints his natural
theology beyond repair. Hume sums up his view of the matter thus:
The true conclusion is that the original Source of all things is
entirely indifferent to all these principles, and has no more
regard to good above ill than to heat above cold, or to
drought above moisture, or to light above heavy
The whole presents nothing but the idea of a blind nature,
impregnated by a great vivifying principle, and pouring forth

" Hume, Dialoptes, 66.
" Hume, Dialogues, 78.
" Hume, Dialogues, 79.
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from her lap, without discernment or parental care, her
maimed and abortive children.^^
Butler approaches his demonstrations of the existence of an afterlife, the
nature of morality and God's ultimate judgment of us in a somewhat
nonstandard fashion. Most who have argued for the existence of an
afterhfe, for example, do so on the grounds that injustice is rampant in
this world and therefore the scales will be balanced by a just God in the
next. Butler, I take it, sees that this argument illicitly attributes the
quality of justness to God when we have not yet found proof of it in
nature. Butler's attempt to remain within the boimds of natural
religion is evident throughout the Analogy as he claims that there are
perfections in nature, that we cannot meaningfully imagine that things
could be better and that moral lessons must serve some higher purpose.
It seems that Butler is aware that many interpretations of the teleological argument run afoul of the following Humean critique:
You find certain phenomena in nature. You seek a cause or
author. You imagine that you have found him. You after
wards become so enamoured of this offspring of your brain,
that you imagine it impossible, but he must produce some
thing greater and more perfect than the present scene of
things, which is so full of ill and disorder. You forget that
this superlative intelligence and benevolence are entirely
imaginary, or, at least, without any foundation in reason; and
that you have no ground to ascribe to him any qualities, but
what you see he has actually exerted and displayed in his
productions.^'
But, in the end, it is equally apparent that Butler cannot get the
conclusions he wants in the Analogy without making the same illicit
assumptions about God's nature.

" Hume, Dialogues, 79.
^ EncSteinheTg,ed., An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Indianipolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, 1977), 95.
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^ Hume Contra Ray ^

Hume has two lines of attack on the minimalist interpretation of the
teleological argument. The first argument focuses on whether the
analogy best supported by the evidence is an analogy with intelligent
activity. Htxme believes that the whole of the universe is more like a
living thing than a machine. Here, Philo explains this analogy to
Demea;
I affirm that there are other parts of the universe (besides the
machine of human invention) which bear still a greater
resemblance to the fabric of the world, and which, therefore,
afford a better conjecture concerning the universal origin of
this system. These parts are animals and vegetables. The
world plainly resembles an animal or a vegetable than it does
a watch or a knitting-loom. Its cause, therefore, it is more
probable, resembles the cause of the former. The cause of the
former is generation or vegetation. The cause, therefore, of
the world we may infer to be something similar or analogous
to generation or vegetation.^'
Demea then claims that we cannot imagine this to be true, in essence,
that the presence of a giant vegetative thing like the universe will still
need to be explained.^® Philo replies that we could suppose that comets
are universe seeds and our universe, like a plant, both grew from a seed
and produces more of them. Alternatively, our universes cotild have
hatched from an egg of another universe. Demea then objects that there
is no possible reason to accept or even entertain these wild conjectures
to which Philo immediately replies:
Right...This is the topic on which I have all along insisted. I
have still asserted that we have no data to establish any
system of cosmogony. Our experience, so imperfect in itself

" Hume, Dialo^es, 47.
^ Many peoplethink the same thing about the mechanisms of evolution. Oncethey understand
the theory, they then claim that God must have created evolution as a means to his ends.
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and so limited both in extent and duration, can afford us no
probable conjecture concerning the whole of things.^^ 48
That is, we cannot make any reasonable guesses as to the cause of the
universe because we have no idea what could cause a universe, and
secondly, we cannot even be justified in believing that the universe has
a cause, since it is a singular thing in our experience.
Next, Hume rightly asks why we select intelligence as an explana
tion for the universe when it is physical generation and vegetation that
gives us the most impressive grounds for analogy in the first place.
After all, it is physical generation that gets us the eye as well as the
capacity to reason at all in our experience.
In his final critique of the analogy, Hume takes issue with the
tendency to copy the perceived order here onto the rest of the universe
which we do not see: "The narrow view of a peasant who makes his
domestic economy the rule for the government of kingdoms is in
comparison a pardonable sophism.
Hume's other line of attack rests on his claim that the argument
relies on a premise which, if allowed, proves too much and if aban
doned, scuttles the whole enterprise. The premise is that complex
systems need explaining by appeal to other complex systems. In the
Dialogues, Hume seems to speak directly to this point:
Naturalists indeed very justly explain particular effects
through more general causes, though these general causes
themselves should remain in the end totally inexplicable. But
they never surely thought it satisfactory to explain a particu
lar effect by a particular cause, which was no more to be
accounted for than the effect itself. An idealsystem, arranged
of itself, without a precedent design, is not a whit more
explicable than a material one, which attains its order in a like
manner, nor is there any more difficulty in the latter supposi
tion than in the former."

" Hume, Dialogues, 48.
" Hume, Dialopies, 22.
" Hume, Dialogues, 36.
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By Hume's rules, we should expect them to stop at the inexplicable in
the natural world, as Hume has his interlocutors consider here;
When I enquired concerning the cause of that supreme reason
and intelligence, into which he resolves everything; he told
me, that the impossibility of satisfying such enquiries could
never be admitted as an objection in any species of philoso
phy. We must stop somewhere, says he; nor is it ever within the
reach of human capacity to explain ultimate causes, or show the
last connections of any objects. It is sufficient ifthe steps, so far as
we go, are supported by experience and ohservation...Pca.d when
Cleanthes asks me what is the cause of my great vegetative or
generative faculty, I am equally entitled to ask him the cause
of his great reasoning principle. These questions we have
agreed to forebear on each side; and it is chiefly his interest on
the present occasion to stick to this agreement.^'*
Eventually, since these questions of origin must end, it is better that
they end here in the observed world instead of some imagined other
order.
Finally, it is not as if Hume fails utterly to speculate about the
teleologist's worry that we need an explanation for organized complex
ity of the living world;
Is there a system, an order, an economy of things, by which
matter can preserve that perpetual agitation, which seems
essential to it, and yet maintain constancy in the forms, which
it produces? There certainly is such an economy; For this is
actually the case with the present world. The continual
motion of matter, therefore, in less than infinite transposi
tions, must produce this economy or order, and by its very
natures, that order, when once established, supports itself, for
many ages, if not to eternity. But whenever matter is so
poised, arranged and adjusted as to continue in perpetual
motion, and yet preserve a constancy in the forms, its

" liame,Didogues,50.
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situation must, of necessity, have all the same appearance of
art and contrivance which we observe at present.^'
So Hume is, in essence, asserting that anything like our universe will
have the appearance of having been designed, but that this is no reason
to search for an explanation. If we accept the claim that all complex
systems need explaining, then at some point, we will be left with a thing
standing in need of explanation for which there can be none. Thus, we
need to reject the desire to explain things thus. When Hume is finished,
the feeling that we are not through with our explanations until we
explain the apparent complexity should be dissipated. The enhghtenment thinkers, Paley, Darwin and all the modem thinkers who look for
such explanations are engaged in a doomed hunt, whether they know
it or not.

^ Hume's Stopping Point ^
Hume seems to stop short of atheism in the Dialogues. Near the end,
he says that the whole of natural religion resolves itself to one proposi
tion: "That the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear
some remote analogy to human intelligence."'^ He goes on to say that
the analogy cannot be carried any further than intelligence—no other
mental, moral or aesthetic qualities can be attributed to the universe.
Hume thinks that this leaves very little difference between theists and
atheists:
I ask the theist if he does not allow that there is a great and
immeasurable, because incomprehensible, difference between
the human and the divine mind; the more pious he is, the
more readily will he assent to the affirmative...I next turn to
the atheist, who, I assert, is only nominally so and can never
possibly be in earnest, and I ask him whether, from the
coherence and apparent sympathy in all the parts of the
world, there be not a certain degree of analogy among all the
" Hume, Dialogues, 53.
" Hume, Dialogttes, 94.
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operations of nature...and the structure of human thoughthe will readily acknowledge it..."Where then, cry I to both
these antagonists, is the subject of your dispute? The theist
allows that the original intelligence is very different from
human reason; the atheist allows that the original principle of
order bears some remote analogy to it.^^

This leaves Hume at least endorsing the minimalist interpretation of the
teleological argument, just as Ray and Butler did. However, a broader
reading of Hume's works will show that he should not take this as his
final position on natural religion. Hume's standards of belief-formation
should lead him to atheism rather than this mitigated deism.
Let us take Hume's standards of belief from the Enquiry along with
his call to apportion belief to evidence:
A wise man, therefore, proportions his behef to the evidence.
In such opinions as are founded on an infallible experience, he
expects the event with the last degree of assurance, and
regards his past experience as a full proof of the future exis
tence of that event. In other cases, he proceeds with more
caution: He weighs the opposite experiments: He considers
which side is supported by the greater number of experi
ments; to that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation; and
when at last he fixes his judgment, the evidence exceeds not
what we properly
probability?^
According to this and other passages in the Enquiry, I should not
believe that an extraordinary claim is true unless not believing it would
involve me in believing something that is even more extraordinary. So
could one, on Hume's grounds, ever come to have reasons to believe in
God? Certainly it would be an extraordinary claim, given what Hume
has argued before. First, the testimony of others is irrelevant—there is
always a better explanation for another person's behef in God than that
God exists: the person could be mistaken, lying, hallucinating or any
number of things, each of which is more plausible, because it has been

" Hume, Dialogues, 85-86.
" Steinberg, Enquiry, 73-74.
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observed before, than that there is an omnipotent, omniscient and
morally perfect God in existence. But what about my personal religious
experiences, if I should have them.? Well, let's cut to the chase and
assume God just manifests himself to me and declares he is what he is,
or however I should rephrase that. Prima facie, I should not believe
him. So what do we do? We could have a test of knowledge, a sort of
Who Wants to Be God? game show, but all this could possibly reveal to
me is that he knows all I know and still keeps making assertions I can
neither confirm nor deny. Similarly, with demonstrations of power.
All he can do is show me that his powers outstrip mine. In terms of
being good, well, let's just say it wouldn't take long for him to pull into
the lead here, but I still couldn't know whether he was morally perfect
or just better than I. So, by this test, I do not (and cannot) have any
reason to believe that the being before me is God. I just can't get the
requisite evidence.
But what if I had a different sort of experience with the Divine—a
sort of "blinding on the road to Damascus?" In such a case, /might well
come to believe in God, but would I be rational? Here, the first person
perspective gets in the way. From the third person point of view, you
should say something like:
It is possible (since anything is) that Michael has had an
experience that rationally compels him to believe but which
cannot be communicated to me with its full rational force.
Should I take his hidden grotmds to be valid and believe as
well? Let's see—I've never had such God-revealing experi
ences, and the privacy of mental states makes it such that I
don't know whether others have had them either. But I have
had experience of other people going insane and believing all
manner of things because of chemical imbalances in their
brains. While Michael is not completely nuts, the past and
the rules of rational belief formation compel me to believe
that his reasons for belief in God are far more likely to be
social or organic than supernatural, and thus I should not
believe in the existence of God.
Thus, it seems to me there is a good Humean argument against its ever
being rational to believe in God, even though there will be lots of
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people who do. This seems like it should be enough for any soon-to-beformer deist, unless that party wants the equally impossible proof (by
Humean standards) that there is no God.
Finally, agnosticism about a thing's existence is not as milktoasty
as many think. I assume we all share my agnosticism about the fullgrown African elephant in the room (the floppy-eared kind). But, since
we cotild be in the grips of a deceiver, I suppose most of you would not
scruple to declare yourselves to be a-elephantists, if that means saying
you know there is not a full-grown African elephant in the room in the
stake-your-life-on-it sense so common to epistemological discussions.
Nonetheless, I think we are all a-elephantists after a fashion in the sense
that we believe there is not a full-grown African elephant in the room.
We assess the evidence, find no reason to endorse the existence claim
and reasons (however defeasible) to endorse the negation of the
existence claim. All of this is consistent with Hume's methodology. If
this is plausible, it seems to me that a fallibilistic atheism is the position
that Hume should have settled for, so long as such atheism is not
merely a new dogmatism to replace the old religious ones.
Hume allows us to endorse the position that Dawkins thought
impossible: "intellectually fulfilled atheism" without Darwin's
evolutionary theory. Anyone who carefully attends to the arguments
Hume marshals should see the complexity of living things merely as a
puzzle for natural science which may (or may not) be solved by science.
Just as our current ignorance as to the total dynamic explanation of
Saturn's rings is a problem for physics and not metaphysics, the causes
of the complexities of the natural world are areas for scientific inquiry,
not proofs of divine design. Ultimate explanations will always be
outside the reach of empirical science, but that is no reason to believe
in a transcendent explanation of the natural world. It is, therefore,
completely consistent to claim along with Dawkins's dinner guest that
the living world needs no explaining. One can be an intellectually
fulfilled atheist, even if one is not schooled in biology.

